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COVID-19-related religious discrimination claims through the lens of the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The onset of the global COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in various stay-at-home orders 
and other state-level restrictions on participation in live group events, including in-person 
religious services.  These restrictions have not been implemented uniformly across the states.  As 
time has passed since the first reported COVID-19 cases in the U.S., states have started to lift 
various aspects of these social gathering restrictions.  As other parts of the community and 
economy begin to “reopen,” however, many states continue to limit in-person religious services 
in an effort to contain the spread of the coronavirus.  These restrictions have led to constitutional 
challenges pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause.   
This paper analyzes the constitutionality of COVID-19 related restrictions on in-person 
religious gatherings.  Section II explores the scientific basis that underlies these state-mandated 
restrictions and discusses examples of religious discrimination claims that have been brought in 
the wake of coronavirus.  Section III provides an overview of the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise 
jurisprudence.  Section IV analyzes the constitutionality of COVID-19 orders under the Free 
Exercise Clause; specifically, this paper evaluates three recent COVID-19-related Free Exercise 
decisions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court: S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 
Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, and Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo.  Ultimately, 
this paper concludes that COVID-19-related restrictions on in-person religious gatherings could 
withstand constitutional scrutiny under both the standard of “facially neutral and generally 
applicable” set forth in Employment Division v. Smith as well as the heightened standard of strict 
scrutiny.   
II. BACKGROUND  
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a. Scientific Basis for COVID-19 Restrictions  
The novel coronavirus (also known as COVID-19) is an infectious disease which can 
lead to numerous short- and long-term health issues and in more serious cases, can result in 
death.1  According the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC’s) data tracker, as of 
October 2020, there were over eight million confirmed cases in the United States, resulting in 
over 220,000 deaths.2  A vaccine to combat the virus is not yet available to the mass public.3   
The disease is known to spread most easily when a person who has been exposed to the 
virus “coughs, sneezes, or talks, and droplets from their mouth or nose are launched into the air 
and land in the mouths of people nearby.”4  Moreover, exposed individuals can spread the virus 
even without experiencing any COVID-19 related symptoms themselves.5  With this knowledge 
in mind, doctors and public health organizations like the CDC recommend that the most effective 
method of tackling the spread of COVID-19 is to practice “social distancing.”6  Social distancing 
involves keeping at least six feet of distance from anyone who is not part of one’s immediate 
household and avoiding crowded places, or spaces where it is impracticable to keep six feet away 
from others.7 
Keeping in mind that social distancing is essential in controlling the spread of 
coronavirus, it naturally follows that it the best approach would be to limit the number of people 
 
1 Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/dotw/covid-19/index.html (last updated 
August 26, 2020). 
2 CDC COVID Data Tracker, CDC, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases_casesinlast7days (last updated 
October 21, 2020). 
3 CDC, supra note 1. 
4 Social Distancing, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html 
(last updated July 15, 2020).  
5 Id. 
6 Id.  The CDC recommends that social distancing is most effective to combat the spread of the coronavirus when it 
is combined with additional preventative action including “wearing a mask, avoiding touching your face with 
unwashed hands, and frequently washing your hands with soap and water for at least 20 seconds.” 
7 CDC, supra note 4. 
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gathering any particular location; in fact, this is exactly what the scientists have recommended.8  
In places where these recommendations have been ignored, disastrous results have followed.9  
“Superspreading” events (a term used for events involving a large gathering of people during the 
pandemic) have had particularly devastating effects.10  Research has shown that 
“superspreading” events have accounted for up to 80 percent of new COVID-19 transmissions in 
areas where they are held.11  Example of these events include weddings, funerals, and (perhaps 
infamously) places of worship.12   
In South Korea, for example, a single megachurch experienced an outbreak of COVID-19 
that infected over 7,000 of its congregants.13  In California, more than 180 individuals were 
exposed to COVID-19 as a result of attendance at a single religious service.14  A similar story 
has been repeated numerous times across the world.  As a result, scientists have urged that these 
types of gatherings should be restricted wherever possible, and that stopping these 
superspreading events will significantly assist in controlling the spread of COVID-19.15 
b. Overview of COVID-19 Related State Orders 
Governments around the world were forced to take swift action to protect their citizenry 
from the harms of COVID-19.  Knowing how the virus spreads and lacking a vaccine or other 
meaningful treatments to fight the illness, the most effective method was to limit the gathering of 
 
8 Id. 
9 Dillion C. Adam & Benjamin J. Cowling, Just Stop the Superspreading, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/opinion/coronavirus-superspreaders.html. 
10 Id.  See also Christie Aschwanden, How ‘Superspreading’ Events Drive Most COVID-19 Spread, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN (June 23, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-superspreading-events-drive-most-
covid-19-spread1/. 
11 Id. 
12 Aschwanden, supra note 10. 
13 Raphael Rashid, Being Called a Cult is One Thing, Being Blamed for an Epidemic Is Quite Another, N.Y. TIMES 
(March 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/opinion/coronavirus-south-korea-church.html. 
14 Meredith Deliso, Nearly 200 possibly exposed to coronavirus at religious service that violated stay-at-home 
orders, ABC NEWS (May 17, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/US/200-possibly-exposed-coronavirus-religious-
service-violated-stay/story?id=70733928. 
15 Adam & Cowling, supra note 9. 
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people in large groups.16  To that end, most governments started restricting mass gatherings to 
enforce social distancing.17 
In the United States, President Trump declared COVID-19 a national emergency on 
March 13, 2020, two weeks after the United States’ first coronavirus-related death was reported 
in Seattle, Washington.18  The White House and the CDC issued guidelines urging people to 
avoid all social gatherings of more than 10 people, work or attend school from home whenever 
possible, avoid eating or drinking at bars or restaurants, avoid discretionary travel, and practice 
good self-hygiene.19  Additionally, the guidelines advised governors to close schools if the 
coronavirus was identified in the community associated with the schools.20  Most importantly, 
the guidelines advised states to close bars, restaurants, gyms and “other indoor and outdoor 
venues where groups of people congregate” if there is any threat of COVID-19 spreading in the 
community.21  
At the state level, all 50 states declared states of emergency and governors began to use 
their executive powers to implement stay-at-home orders in the hopes of slowing the spread of 
the disease.22  Almost every state in the country closed its schools to avoid COVID-19’s rapid 
spread among children.23  Initially, many states required all nonessential business to remain 
 
16 How to Protect Yourself & Others, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-
sick/prevention.html, (last updated Sept. 11, 2020).  
17 Rachel Treisman, West: Coronavirus-Related Restrictions By State, NPR (Sept. 3, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/05/01/847416108/west-coronavirus-related-restrictions-by-state.  
18 Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html.   




21 Id.  
22 Treisman, supra note 17.  
23 Kamran Rahman and Alice Miranda Ollstein, How states are responding to coronavirus, in 7 maps, POLITICO 
(last updated Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/24/coronavirus-state-response-maps-146144.  
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closed, and limited essential businesses to grocery stores, pharmacies, and hospitals.24  Most 
importantly, these orders generally banned large gatherings of people for any reason; this 
included closing sports stadiums, movies theaters, shopping malls, and private social gatherings 
including those for religious purposes.25   
For example, the Governor of Virginia issued Executive Order 53, which banned all 
gatherings of more than 10 people (public and private), as well as the operation of all dining 
establishments, all recreational and entertainment businesses, and all other businesses that it 
deemed nonessential.26  Executive Order 53, however, carved out exemptions for essential 
businesses and this mainly included businesses which sold food items, medicine or medical 
equipment, alcohol, home improvement items, and communications or electronics items.27  This 
was shortly followed by Executive Order 55, which required all residents to remain at home, 
with the exception of essential travel, limited to obtaining essential items or medical services.28  
Executive Order 55 reiterated Executive Order 53’s ban of gatherings of more than 10 people; 
then, it explicitly banned parties, celebrations, religious gatherings, any other social event.29  
Beginning in the summer of 2020, many states started to loosen their ban on keeping 
nonessential businesses closed and started taking steps forward to reopen their economies.30  For 
example, California moved into Phase 2 of its reopening plan in May 2020, which meant that in-
person retail shopping and houses of worship (which were both initially required to remained 
 
24 Id. 
25 Id.  See e.g., Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 458 F. Supp. 3d 418 (E.D. Va. 2020). 
26 Northam, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 426. 
27 Id.  Businesses which were deemed to be essential could not, however, operated at their pre-COVID-19 capacities.  
Executive order 53 required that in person shopping be limited to 10 individuals per establishment and everyone 
adhered to social distancing guidelines.  
28 Northam, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 426. 
29 Id. 
30 Treisman, supra note 17.  
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closed) were allowed to resume operation and services at a reduced capacity.31  Mass gatherings 
remained restricted in many states throughout the summer.32  But as the summer ended, many 
states began to reverse some of their reopening plans, as number of new positive COVID-19 
cases began to rise.33  Overall, in many states, religious institutions were not deemed essential 
and were subjected to various limitations on in-person gatherings.34   
c. Overview of COVID-19 Related Religious Discrimination Claims  
Avoiding large social gatherings is a crucial practice to “flattening the curve” of COVID-
19.35  Due to necessity, all states have carved out exemptions from their general bans on large 
gathering for various essential activities; some have included religious gathering in the essential 
category, whereas many others continue to ban or limit live gatherings for religious purposes.36  
As a consequence, many religious organizations have challenged these bans as being 
unconstitutional and in violation of their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion and 
freedom of assembly.37  
States’ decisions to exclude houses of worship from their “essential” categories has 
triggered a number of lawsuits in various jurisdictions.38  Religious organizations have argued 
that religion is a fundamental part of many people’s lives, making it an essential function of 






35 CDC, supra note 4.  
36 Treisman, supra note 17. 
37 Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68415, at 23 (D.N.M. Apr. 17, 2020). 
38 Isabella Redjai, Coronavirus: Churches are essential. If protesters can assemble, so should people of faith, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 8, 2020), https://amp.usatoday.com/amp/332308200. 
39 Peggy Fletcher Stack, Religion is essential, even during a pandemic, Latter-day Saint apostle David Bednar tells 
global forum, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.sltrib.com/religion/2020/10/14/religion-is-
essential/. 
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stores were allowed to remain open during COVID-19 shutdowns as “essential businesses,” 
while in-person religious services (which in their view are far more essential to people’s 
wellbeing) were categorized as nonessential.40  
Additionally, in some places, religious organizations claimed they were being 
unequivocally discriminated against by the stay at home orders.41  In Nevada, a state order 
limited houses of worship to operate at a 50 person capacity, regardless of the size of the 
building; however, the state allowed casinos to operate at 50 percent capacity, which in theory 
could mean thousands of people in the same building.42  The sense among some religious 
organizations that they were being discriminated against was exacerbated by the protests which 
followed George Floyd’s death.43  California, which limited attendance at places of worship to 
25 percent capacity, nonetheless did not place similar limits on thousands of protestors who 
gathered to protest the death of George Floyd at the hands of the police.44  These organizations 
argued that the state selectively protected the First Amendment Freedom of Assembly rights of 
the protesters but failed to protect the same rights when it applied to religious gatherings.45  
Many religious organizations attributed the issue to government officials’ inability to 
fully comprehend how fundamental faith is to the lives of so many Americans.46  They 
highlighted the reality that for many, a house of worship is more than a place to pray; instead it is 
a community.47  They urge that just as a protests cannot take place on Zoom, religious 
community cannot happen on a virtual format either.48  This sense of discrimination and 
 
40 Redjai, supra note 38. 
41 Id. 
42 Id.  Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2604 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
43 Redjai, supra note 38. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Stack, supra note 39. 
47 Id. 
48 Redjai, supra note 38. 
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interpretation of the constitution is not only limited to religious organizations; President Trump 
also stated that religious gathering should be regarded as essential.49  President Trump declared 
houses of worships to be essential and demanded that governors allow them to hold in person 
services.50   
Separately, many religious organizations argue that they are well equipped to take the 
necessary precautions to protect themselves and their congregants by setting their own quotas on 
attendees, checking temperatures, requiring masks and practicing social distancing.51  Ultimately, 
frustrated with the state bans and limitations on their right to assemble and to practice their 
religion the way they see fit, many have taken to the courts, where the constitutionality of these 
limitations is now being determined.  
  
 
49 Aylin Woodward, Trump declared houses of worship essential. Mounting evidence shows they’re super-spreader 
hotspots, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 28, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.in/science/news/trump-just-declared-
houses-of-worship-essential-mounting-evidence-shows-theyre-super-spreader-hotspots-/articleshow/75907337.cms. 
50 Id. 
51 Redjai, supra note 38. 
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III. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE  
The Free Exercise Clause provides that “Congress shall make no law…prohibiting the 
free exercise [of religion].”52  This clause has been the subject of myriad Supreme Court 
decisions over the years.  Through this jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court has 
placed certain limits on the bounds of the Free Exercise Clause. 
Free Exercise claims “usually arise when a citizen’s civic obligation to comply with a law 
conflicts with that citizen’s religious beliefs or practices.”53  Through various cases dating back 
more than a century, the Supreme Court has limited the seemingly absolute nature of the Free 
Exercise Clause to impose some limits on “the ability to act on [religious] beliefs” where such 
limits are related to government objectives.54  For example, in the 1878 case Reynolds v. United 
States, the Supreme Court upheld a federal prohibition on polygamy in the face of a challenge 
brought by Mormons who argued that the practice of polygamy was a part of their religious 
tradition (and, in fact, a duty of their faith).55  In upholding the ban, the Court reasoned that 
Congress had not legislated against the Mormons’ religious belief in the duty of polygamy, but 
rather had legislated against an action taken on that belief “which [was] in violation of social 
duties or subversive to good order.”56  Reynolds thus stood for the proposition that there is a 
distinction between laws that restrict religious belief and laws that restrict actions based on 
religious belief.57   
 
52 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
53 Claire Mullally, Free-Exercise Clause Overview, FREEDOM FORUM INSTITUTE (Sept. 16, 2011), 
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-religion/free-exercise-clause-
overview/. 
54 Id.  
55 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
56 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (1878). 
57 Mullally, supra note 53. 
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The Reynolds rational basis test formed the bedrock of Free Exercise jurisprudence well 
into the twentieth century, insofar as generally applicable laws (such as a ban on polygamy) were 
concerned.58  In 1940, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause was incorporated against the 
states in Cantwell v. Connecticut.59  In Cantwell, the Court overturned the convictions of two 
Jehovah’s Witnesses who had been charged with violating a state statute requiring door-to-door 
solicitors to obtain a certificate before soliciting funds from the public, on the grounds that the 
First Amendment was incorporated against the states via the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and that the convictions violated the petitioners’ First Amendment right 
to the free exercise of religion.60  The Cantwell decision laid the groundwork for citizens to 
challenge state-level restrictions on religious exercise. 
The “rational basis” test established in Reynolds was replaced in 1963 by a “compelling 
interests” test established in Sherbert v. Verner.61  Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-Day 
Adventist Church was fired from her job with the State of South Carolina because she refused to 
work on Saturdays (Saturday being the Sabbath Day in the Seventh-Day Adventist religious 
tradition).62  She subsequently filed a state unemployment claim after she was unable to find 
another job (again because she refused to work on Saturdays), but her application for 
unemployment was denied on the basis that she was ineligible because she “failed, without good 
cause, to accept available suitable work when offered” to her.63  Sherbert argued that the state’s 
denial of unemployment benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause, but the South Carolina 
Supreme Court ruled against her, holding that the state’s unemployment requirements “‘place[d] 
 
58 Fredrick Gedicks & Michael McConnell, The Free Exercise Clause, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2020), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendment-i/interps/265. 
59 Id.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).  
60 Id.  Gedicks & McConnell, supra note 58. 
61 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also Gedicks & McConnell, supra note 58. 
62 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398. 
63 Id.  
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no restriction upon [Sherbert’s] freedom of religion nor does it in any way prevent her in the 
exercise of her right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the dictates 
of her conscience.’”64  The United States Supreme Court overturned this decision, holding that a 
law that resulted in “any incidental burden on the free exercise of…religion” required the state to 
provide justification in the form of a “compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject 
within the state’s constitutional power to regulate.”65  Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan 
thus changed the Free Exercise standard from “rational basis” to “compelling state interest,” a 
much higher bar for the state to clear in order to justify a law of general applicability that 
incidentally burdens a citizen’s religious practices and beliefs.66 
In addition to introducing the “compelling interest” test for constitutionality under the 
Free Exercise Clause, Sherbert also stood for the proposition that a law that is generally 
applicable on its face can have unintended and unequal effects on the practice of certain religious 
beliefs.67  This principle was reaffirmed nine years later in Wisconsin v. Yoder.68  In Yoder, a 
group of Amish parents challenged a Wisconsin law that required children to attend school 
through the age of 16.69  The Amish family argued that this requirement violated their free 
exercise of religion because exposing their children to outside schooling after age 14 would 
violate their traditional religious beliefs and undermine the insular nature of the Amish 
community.70  The Supreme Court found in favor of the Amish family, holding that although the 
state had a strong interest in compulsory education, the Amish also had a strong interest in their 
centuries-old tradition of training young adults after the age of 14 to be part of their (“separated”) 
 
64 Id. at 40. 
65 Id. at 404. 
66 Mullally, supra note 53. 
67 Id. 
68 Id.; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
69 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 243. 
70 Id. 
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community, and that the state’s interest could be achieved by requiring mandatory education 
through the age of 14 (rather than 16).71  In this decision, the Court found that the generally 
applicable law requiring formal education applied unequally to the particular group on the basis 
of religious belief, and that to justify the law, the state would need to show that the interest could 
not otherwise be served.72 
Based on Sherbert and Yoder, for the next three decades, to find a violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause, the relevant jurisprudence required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the 
government had significantly burdened a sincerely motivated religious practice in a manner that 
was not justified by a compelling state interest.73  However, there was a major shift in Supreme 
Court Free Exercise jurisprudence in 1990 in the case Employment Division v. Smith.74  Smith 
(sometimes known as the peyote case) involved two drug rehabilitation counselors who were 
fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote (a controlled substance under state law) at a religious 
ceremony of the Native American Church.75  The counselors sued after they were denied 
unemployment benefits on the basis that they were terminated for job-related misconduct.76  In 
writing for the majority, Justice Scalia noted that the state law banning peyote possession was 
facially neutral; in other words, it applied to everyone and was not specifically aimed at the 
religious use of peyote.77  The Court refused to apply the “compelling interest” test used in 
Sherbert and Yoder; instead, Scalia wrote, the Court had held in favor of Free Exercise claimants 
under that standard only where the Free Exercise claim was related to other constitutional 
protections, like the right of parents to direct their children’s upbringing and education in Yoder, 
 
71 Id. at 245. 
72 Id. at 245-46; Mullally, supra note 53. 
73 Id. 
74 Empl. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Gedicks & McConnell, supra note 58. 
75 Smith, 494 U.S. at 875. 
76 Id. 
77 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 
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and that “the present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim 
unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right.”78  Because the counselors could 
not show that the denial of their unemployment benefits were tied to some other constitutional 
right, and because there was “no contention that [the state’s] drug law represents an attempt to 
regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one’s children 
in those beliefs,” their Free Exercise claim failed.79  The rule from Smith is that “the government 
is no longer required to articulate a compelling interest in regulation that burdens religious 
exercise so long as the law is ‘neutral’ and ‘generally applicable.’”80  Accordingly, taken 
together with Sherbert and Yoder, there exist three types of cases where strict scrutiny continues 
to apply to a Free Exercise claim: (1) a claim where the law is not generally applicable or facially 
neutral (Smith), (2) a claim requiring an individualized assessment (Sherbert), and (3) hybrid 
claims, as described above (Yoder). 
Smith represented the first time since Sherbert that the Supreme Court declined to apply 
the “compelling interests” test and thus created significant uncertainty in the application of the 
Free Exercise Clause to laws of general applicability.81  In a case three years after Smith, 
however, the Supreme Court found that a city ordinance violated the Free Exercise Clause 
precisely because it was not a facially-neutral or generally applicable.82  In that case, the City of 
Hialeah passed ordinances which targeted the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye and its 
practices.83  Specifically, the ordinance prohibited ritual slaughters and sacrifices of animals, 
which was a key practice in the Santeria tradition.84  The Supreme Court struck down the 
 
78 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881; Mullally, supra note 53. 
79 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
80 Zalman Rothschild, Free Exercise’s Lingering Ambiguity, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 282, 283 (2020). 
81 Id. 
82 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 524-25. 
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ordinance, reasoning that its history showed that it specifically targeted the Santeria faith, for 
example by providing exemptions for other types of animal slaughter.  Consequently, the Court 
held that the ordinance was not facially neutral, nor generally applicable in its execution; and that 
it burdened a particular religious practice.85  As a result, in Lukumi, the standard the Court used 
to evaluate the ordinances’ constitutionality was strict scrutiny.86   
IV. ANALYSIS  
Courts have applied the Free Exercise doctrine inconsistently to COVID-19 stay-at-home 
orders.87  This inconsistency has led to a patchwork of holdings with no clear rules to guide 
officials as they weigh constitutional considerations against public health and safety protocols 
related to a global pandemic.  As described further below, courts ought to apply the Smith test, 
determining whether stay-at-home orders are generally applicable and facially neutral, by 
assessing whether the orders restrict similar types of social interaction equally.88  If not, courts 
should then turn to a strict scrutiny analysis and assess whether the restrictions at issue are 
narrowly tailored to address a compelling state interest.89  This section addresses each of these 
legal analyses in turn. 
 
85 Id. at 546-47. See also Mullally, supra note 53. 
86 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547. 
87 This paper focuses on COVID-19 orders restricting in-person religious services through the lens of the Free 
Exercise clause.  This does not suggest that the Free Exercise Clause is the only constitutional provision that could, 
in theory, be used to challenge COVID-19 orders.  For example, it is conceivable that a litigant could challenge such 
orders under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause or Right to Assembly Clause and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause argument is unlikely to 
succeed, however, based on a 1905 United States Supreme Court case, upholding a Massachusetts law that allowed 
cities to require that residents be vaccinated against smallpox on the grounds that the law was a legitimate exercise 
of state power to protect public health and safety.  Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
88 S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020). 
89 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531. 
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a. Under Smith 
The first question in this analysis is whether the state COVID-19 orders are facially 
neutral and generally applicable.90  If they are, Smith says that there is no further analysis 
needed, as facially neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause 
if they are supported by rational basis.91  This section will address each of these prongs. 
1. Facial Neutrality 
As stated by the Supreme Court in Lukumi, “[t]he meaning of ‘neutrality’ – or more 
precisely its absence – is fairly clear: [w]hen laws are enacted “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite 
of,’ their suppression of religious practice….”, these laws are not neutral.92  Simply put, a law 
cannot be neutral if it is specifically designed to target a particular religious practice.93  
Conversely, facially neutral laws are those that read neutral on the surface.94 
Under this standard, it is clear that orders restricting the size and location of all mass 
gatherings, regardless of whether they involve religious or secular activity, are facially neutral.95  
It is difficult to argue that restrictions on mass gatherings implemented specifically to address the 
global pandemic after it had reached U.S. soil were implemented for any other reason but the 
stated purpose of combating the spread of the virus.  As described above, these orders were a 
reaction to advice from the medical and scientific community that a key way to reduce COVID-
19 infections and deaths was to limit opportunities for individuals to gather in groups for 
prolonged periods of time.96  The stay-at-home orders restricting mass gatherings (including, but 
 
90 Smith, 494 U.S. at 880. 
91 Id.  See also Caroline Mala Corbin, Religious Liberty in a Pandemic, 70 DUKE L.J ONLINE 1, 6 (2020). 
92 Rothschild, supra note 80, at 283. 
93 Id.  See also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531. 
94 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.  
95 E.g., Northam, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 428 (holding that state orders were facially neutral and lacked discriminatory 
treatment because they prohibited “all social gathering of more than ten individuals, secular and religious.”). 
96 See e.g., CDC, supra note 4.  See also Aschwanden, supra note 10; Adam & Cowling, supra note 9. 
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not limited to, in-person religious services) were a direct response to this scientific consensus, 
and to the extent this is reflected on the face of these orders, they are facially neutral under 
Smith.97     
Some challengers of these orders have argued that they are not facially neutral where the 
order specifically includes religious services in its litany of examples of the types of gatherings 
that are subject to the order’s restrictions.98  This argument is flawed, however, to the extent 
religious services are merely provided as one example of many, such as in the Virginia order.99  
Challengers have also argued that orders that provide for exemptions to general bans on 
gathering are not facially neutral by virtue of those exemptions.100  As described in further detail 
below, this argument is more aptly addressed by the general applicability prong of the Smith 
test.101  In short, orders enacted as a direct response to the pandemic are facially neutral if they 
apply to both secular and religious mass gatherings and do not single out religious services for 
different treatment.102  
2. General Applicability 
The general applicability prong of Smith is arguably more nuanced than the meaning of 
“facially neutral.”103  To pass constitutional muster under Free Exercise jurisprudence, it is not 
sufficient for a law to simply be facially neutral – rather, the application of the law must also be 
 
97 E.g., CDC, supra note 4; CDC, supra note 16.  
98 E.g., Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2020) (mentioning religious groups by 
name as an example of the types of activities restricted does not render the order discriminatory).  See also Northam, 
458 F. Supp. 3d at 429 (E.D. Va. 2020) (“Executive Order 55 presents no neutrality problem….It merely uses 
religious gathering as one of several examples of ‘all public and private in-person gatherings.’ The Orders are 
facially neutral.”); Corbin, supra note 91, at 11.  
99 E.g., Northam, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 429. 
100 Id. 
101 Smith, 494 U.S. at 880. 
102 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531; Corbin, supra note 91, at 11. 
103 Rothschild, supra note 80, at 283. 
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even as between secular and religious conduct.104  “[A] law fails the test of general applicability 
where, ‘in pursuit of legitimate interests, [the government] in a selective manner imposes 
burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief….’”105  In other words, regardless of the 
interests it is seeking to address, and although “all laws are selective to some extent” the 
government is not permitted to single out religiously motivated conduct for particular 
restrictions.106  When a law’s restrictions on conduct include exceptions, this presents challenges 
for courts in determining whether those exceptions tip the law into discriminatory territory from 
a general applicability perspective.  Exceptions leave much up to interpretation.107 
In the coronavirus context, courts have had different interpretations of exceptions 
provided in orders restricting mass gatherings.108  The issue of whether exceptions for certain 
types of in-person interaction render restrictions on live worship services unconstitutional has 
come down to how courts have interpreted what counts as comparable activity to these 
services.109   
For example, in S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, petitioners challenged a 
California COVID-19 order that capped in-person attendance at religious services to 25 percent 
 
104 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533; Northam, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 428. 
105 Northam, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 428 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543). 
106 E.g., Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, 459 F. Supp. 3d 273, 286 (D. Me. 2020) (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 
543). 
107 See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark (applying strict scrutiny to the 
Newark Police Department’s policy prohibiting police officers from wearing beards).  In Fraternal Order of Police, 
the Third Circuit noted that the department’s policy exempted officers with medical conditions and officers acting 
undercover from the beard restriction but did not exempt officers who cited religious reasons for wanting to wear a 
beard.  The Third Circuit held that the policy (1) was not generally applicable because it included medical (secular) 
exemptions but not a religious one, and (2) violated the Free Exercise Clause because the police department did not 
offer a compelling interest to justify providing a secular exemption but not granting similar treatment to officers who 
had to wear beards for religious reasons.  Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 
F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 1999).  
108 S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020). 
109 Compare S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) with S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1615 (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting). 
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occupancy.110  In a concurrence to the Court’s decision to deny an injunction, Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote of the petitioners’ request that “similar or more severe restrictions apply to 
comparable secular gatherings” such as “lectures, concerts, movie showings, spectator sports and 
theatrical performances, where large groups of people gather in close proximity for extended 
periods of time.”111  Chief Justice Roberts continued, “[a]nd the Order exempts or treats more 
leniently only dissimilar activities, such as operating grocery stores, banks, and laundromats, in 
which people neither congregate in large groups nor remain in close proximity for extended 
periods.”112  Stated differently, Chief Justice Roberts compared in-person religious gatherings to 
other types of group activities that take place with large numbers of people congregating in close 
proximity to participate in a common activity.113  In his dissent, Justice Kavanagh took a 
different approach, noting that “comparable secular businesses [were] not subject to a 25% 
occupancy cap, including factories, offices, supermarkets, restaurants, retail stores, pharmacies, 
shopping malls, pet grooming shops, bookstores, florists, hair salons, and cannabis 
dispensaries.”114   
In S. Bay, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanagh therefore disagreed on the 
appropriate criteria to use in determining whether the California order was generally applicable 
for Free Exercise purposes.115  Chief Justice Roberts appeared to compare the characteristics of 
the restricted versus unrestricted gatherings, highlighting distinctions in how people operate 
within the respective settings, while Kavanagh appeared focused on the fact that many secular 
activities were subject to fewer or no restrictions than those imposed on religious gatherings even 
 
110 S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 1613-14. 
114 S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
115 Id. at 1613-14 
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though both types of activity involved people coming into contact with others.116  These 
arguments are illustrative of the approaches courts and litigants have taken to evaluating mass 
gathering restrictions under COVID-19 stay-at-home orders.  
The Chief Justice Roberts approach is more persuasive in light of the abundant evidence 
that mass gatherings contribute to the accelerated spread of coronavirus.117  Religious institutions 
“cannot claim that they are victims of discrimination unless the state is treating like-activities 
differently.”118  Accordingly, whether a COVID-19 order’s restrictions on religious gatherings 
are in fact “generally applicable” should be assessed by whether the order equally restricts 
gatherings of similar types.  This distinction turns on the nature of the conduct associated with 
the relevant gathering.119   
For example, although Kavanagh describes in-person worship services and secular 
businesses such as supermarkets, retail stores, shopping malls, bookstores, florists and pet 
grooming salons (among other similar settings) as “comparable”, in practice, the conduct of 
people in these secular settings is very different from the conduct of participants at in-person 
religious services.120  Whereas “worship services are extended affairs” full of attendees who 
speak, sing, and chant for extended periods of time, behavior in shopping and similar business 
settings is typically marked by brief, quick interactions with limited interpersonal conduct in 
spaces that are conducive to physical distancing.121  These business settings are thus markedly 
different from houses of worship.  Instead, attendance at a religious event is more akin to 
attendance at a concert, movie screening or theatrical performance, where attendees spend 
 
116 Id.  See also Rothschild, supra note 80, at 289. 
117 CDC, supra note 1; Aschwanden, supra note 10; Rothschild, supra note 80, at 290. 
118 Corbin, supra note 91, at 15. 
119 Id. 
120 S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
121 Corbin, supra note 91, at 23. 
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extended periods of time in close quarters with each other, laughing, cheering or otherwise 
expressing emotion similar to how congregants may sing, speak or chant during service.122  The 
casual, often distanced interpersonal conduct that occurs in a store or salon is fundamentally 
dissimilar to the close physical contact experienced in large-group events.123  This distinction is 
paramount because placing restrictions on large-group, close-quarter static gatherings is 
consistent with what public health officials deem necessary to slow the spread of COVID-19.124  
Moreover, as described above, prolonged large-scale gatherings such as in-person religious 
services have been deemed super-spreader events, with high rates of infection being traced to 
single events.125 
Challengers to these COVID-19 orders also point out that certain professional office 
settings, such as those of accountants, lawyers and finance professionals, were permitted to 
remain open under certain of these orders while religious gatherings were restricted.126  Again, 
these are not comparable social settings.  Unlike in-person worship services, professional office 
settings may provide for physical distancing (such as by having individual offices with doors) 
and do not require close interpersonal interaction because meeting sizes can be kept limited 
through teleconferencing and other means.127  These settings are thus distinct from in-person 
religious services and it is not useful to compare the two for purposes of assessing whether 
restrictions on gatherings satisfy the generally applicable standard.  The correct comparison is 
 
122 Id. at 12.  See also S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
123 Corbin, supra note 91, at 23. 
124 Aschwanden, supra note 10. 
125 Id.; Adam & Cowling, supra note 9. 
126 Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 460 F. Supp. 3d 651, 661 (W.D. Ky. 2020). 
127 E.g., Northam, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 431-32. 
 21 
instead between religious gatherings and secular large-group, close proximity gatherings such as 
schools, theaters, sporting events and the like.128   
3. Calvary Chapel and Roman Catholic Diocese 
The Chief Justice Roberts approach described above, whereby restrictions on mass 
gatherings are evaluated for general applicability based on whether they impact gatherings of 
similar qualities equally, is an appropriate and logical standard for courts to employ in assessing 
the constitutionality of COVID-19 orders that restrict in-person worship.129  Nevertheless, it 
seems that the Supreme Court failed to apply Chief Justice Roberts’ rationale in his S. Bay 
concurrence to the two subsequent cases it heard on this topic.130  Because these cases were, like 
S. Bay, about petitions for injunctive relief, they were not decided on the merits.  The Court’s 
potential reasoning in a merits case, however, can be inferred from the decisions made by the 
Court in these applications for injunctive relief. 
In Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, the governor of Nevada issued a COVID-19 
order that restricted in-person attendance at religious services (limiting admission to no more 
than 50 people), but allowing casinos to open with up to 50 percent of maximum occupancy 
(which, for the state’s largest casinos in Las Vegas, could mean up to thousands of casino 
patrons in a single building at one time).131  A Nevada church challenged this COVID-19 order, 
 
128 Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, 459 F. Supp. 3d 273, 286 (D. Me. 2020) (“religious gatherings . . . are more 
akin to restaurants, entertainment venues, movie theaters, and schools”).  
129 S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
130 The Supreme Court has decided three cases involving petitions for injunctive relief from state COVID-19 orders.  
In addition to S. Bay, it has also decided the same issue in Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, and Roman 
Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo.  Additionally, on December 15, 2020, the Supreme Court vacated two district court 
opinions that denied religious organizations injunctions against state COVID-19 orders that set capacity limits on 
worship service attendance.  The Court ordered the district courts to reconsider these cases, in which the plaintiffs 
challenged COVID-19 orders in Colorado and New Jersey, for further consideration in light of the Court’s decision 
in Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo.  High Plains Harvest Church v. Polis, 2020 WL 7345850 (U.S. Dec. 15, 
2020); Kevin v. Murphy, 2020 WL 7346601 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2020). 
131 Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2604 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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arguing that it violated the Free Exercise Clause by, on its face, permitting casinos and certain 
other institutions to abide by a less restrictive occupancy cap than that to which houses of 
worship were required to adhere.132  The Supreme Court denied injunctive relief.133  In a dissent, 
Justice Alito (joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh) argued that the order discriminated in 
favor of casinos in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.134  The dissenters argued that because 
the Nevada COVID-19 order permitted casinos a significantly larger occupancy rate than 
religious institutions, notwithstanding the fact that both settings would permit large groups of 
people to gather in close proximity, the order clearly was not intended to be (and cannot be read 
to be) generally applicable.135   
In denying the petition for injunctive relief, the Court in Calvary Chapel appeared to 
disregard Chief Justice Roberts’ approach in S. Bay of evaluating comparable gatherings, and 
thus signaled how the Court may be likely to decide this type of case on the merits.  Casinos, like 
houses of worship, facilitate the gathering of large numbers of people in close proximity to one 
another.136  Moreover, the interpersonal conduct that occurs within a casino is not transient, 
casual contact like occurs in a supermarket, but rather is designed to be prolonged like a church 
service.137  Casino settings, like in-person religious services, are thus comparable to other large-
group settings like theaters, sports stadiums and schools and should be treated the same by 
restrictions on gatherings.  Accordingly, under Chief Justice Roberts’ S. Bay reasoning, the 
Nevada order would not be found generally applicable (nor facially neutral, because on its face 
the order favored casinos) and would need to be evaluated under a strict scrutiny standard, as 
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described below. 138  This was not the approach the Court signaled, however, in denying the 
injunction, notwithstanding the strong scientific basis to support Roberts’ legal theory of 
comparing similar gatherings to evaluate general applicability.139  
In a subsequent case, Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, the plaintiffs, 
religious organizations in New York City, challenged a statewide order that restricted in-person 
“attendance at religious services in areas classified as ‘red’ or ‘orange’ zones.”140  Instead of 
imposing blanket restrictions statewide, the New York COVID-19 order sought to enforce mass 
gathering restrictions in certain areas based on virus infection rates.141  In areas classified as “red 
zones,” “no more than 10 persons” were allowed to “attend each religious service,” however, 
“businesses categorized as ‘essential’ [were permitted to] admit as many people as they 
wish[ed].142  And the list of ‘essential’ businesses include[d] things such as acupuncture 
facilities, camp grounds, garages, as well as . . . all plants manufacturing chemicals and 
microelectronics and all transportation facilities.”143  In “orange zones,” “attendance at houses of 
worship [was] limited to 25 person,” however, “even non-essential businesses [were permitted 
to] decide for themselves how many persons to admit.”144  In imposing the limits on these 
gatherings, the orders did not consider the size of the house of worship or the safety procedures 
followed by the establishment.145   
 
138 Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts undertook an analysis of the Nevada COVID-19 order under a 
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The Supreme Court granted injunctive relief and prevented New York from enforcing the 
red and orange zones restrictions in a per curiam opinion.146  The Court held that “the applicants 
have made a strong showing” that the New York regulations discriminated against the religious 
organizations by “singl[ing] out houses of worship for especially harsh treatment.”147  
Additionally, the Court found that by specifically naming religious services as a category of 
restricted gathering, the New York order was not neutral.148  As a result, the Court held that 
because the orders “cannot be viewed as neutral” or “‘of general applicability,’ they must satisfy 
‘strict scrutiny[.]’”149  
In issuing this decision, the Court’s reasoning was flawed for two reasons.  First, merely 
naming religious services as a type of restricted gathering – when the order’s restrictions on 
gatherings also applied to secular events in the red and orange zones – is not sufficient to render 
the order “not neutral.”150  Instead of singling out religion on its face, the order merely pointed to 
religious services as an example of a gathering type that would be subject to the order.151  In 
other words, the order did not on its face treat religion differently, but instead was facially 
neutral because secular events were specifically subject to equal restrictions as religious 
gatherings.   
Second, the Court failed to draw the proper comparisons between gathering types in 
evaluating whether the New York order was generally applicable.  The Court did not apply 
Roberts’ reasoning from S. Bay (which, again, is backed by scientific evidence) and instead 
 
146 Id. at *4.  Unlike S. Bay and Calvary Chapel, where the relevant orders were issued without an opinion of the 
Court, in Roman Catholic Diocese, the Court issued a majority opinion, per curiam. 
147 Roman Catholic Diocese, 2020 WL 6948354, at *1. 
148 Id. at *13. 
149 Roman Catholic Diocese, 2020 WL 6948354, at *2; Nelson & Jones, supra note 140. 
150 Corbin, supra note 91, at 11.  See also Northam, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 429 (holding that the ban on mass gatherings 
was neutral because “it merely uses religious gatherings as one of several examples of ‘all public and private in-
person gatherings.’”) 
151 See Agudath Israel of Am. v. Cuomo, 979 F.3d 177, 181 (2d Cir. 2020). 
 25 
compared religious services in the red and orange zones to factually incomparable settings, such 
as camp grounds, manufacturing plants and transportation facilities.152   The settings cited by the 
Court as examples of exempted activities under the New York order are dissimilar to religious 
services in that none of them involve prolonged gatherings in close quarters of large numbers of 
people that may involve singing, chanting, talking or other interpersonal interactions that may 
facilitate the spread of a respiratory illness.153  Again, the proper comparison to religious services 
in the red and orange zones would have been schools, theaters, sporting events or concert halls, 
which faced more severe restrictions under New York’s order than even houses of worship.154  
This was noted by the Second Circuit in Agudath Israel of Am. v. Cuomo, which found that the 
New York order did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because “the order subjects religious 
services to restrictions that are similar to or, indeed, less severe than those imposed on 
comparable secular gatherings” (emphasis in original).155  The Second Circuit’s conclusion that 
the New York order was generally applicable for Free Exercise purposes is consistent with 
Roberts’ conclusions in S. Bay, and the Supreme Court erred in holding otherwise.156   
b. Strict Scrutiny  
As indicated above, to the extent a law is neither facially neutral nor generally applicable, 
a Free Exercise Clause challenge to that law must be assessed under a strict scrutiny standard.157  
To justify a law that burdens religious belief or practice, the government must demonstrate a 
compelling interest in enacting the relevant law and show that it used the least restrictive means 
 
152 Roman Catholic Diocese, 2020 WL 6948354, at *2; S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
153 See Roman Catholic Diocese, 2020 WL 6948354, at *10 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  See also Agudath Israel, 979 
F.3d at 181; Corbin, supra note 91, at 23. 
154 Id. 
155 Agudath Israel, 979 F.3d at 180. 
156 Id. at 181; S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
157 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 578. 
 26 
(i.e., the least burdensome on religion) to enact it.158  Like the Smith standard, this is also a fact-
dependent test.159  In the COVID-19 cases, courts that have analyzed stay-at-home orders under 
strict scrutiny have generally found that the relevant orders were not narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state interest.160  This reasoning is flawed in the context of the coronavirus 
pandemic.161  Few would dispute that the government has a compelling interest in curbing the 
spread of the coronavirus.162  But although courts analyzing gathering restrictions have generally 
found that these restrictions are not narrowly tailored to address that interest, this finding is not 
supported by the science that underlies the relevant restrictions on in-person gatherings.  In other 
words, restrictions on mass social gatherings are narrowly tailored to help curb the spread of 
COVID-19.  There is clear, uniform, scientific consensus among experts that gatherings of large 
groups of people, congregating and speaking in close proximity to one another for extended 
periods of time, are conditions that facilitate the spread of this airborne disease.163 
In Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, because the Court found that the order was not 
facially neutral and generally applicable, the analysis moved to strict scrutiny.164  The Court held 
 
158 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400 (1963); Mullally, supra note 53. 
159 See generally Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2608 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
160 See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese, 2020 WL 6948354, at *3.  See also Beshear, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 614.  
161 Corbin, supra note 91, at 22-24. 
162 In some of the COVID-19 Free Exercise cases, religious organizations have argued that the fact that states 
include exceptions to social gatherings in certain secular settings like grocery stores and pharmacies indicates that 
the state does not actually have a compelling interest in restricting social gatherings.  Berean Baptist Church v. 
Cooper, 460 F. Supp. 3d 651 (E.D.N.C. 2020).  Indeed, in Lukumi, the Court found that the state had not shown a 
compelling interest in regulating the conduct at issue on the basis of numerous exceptions that disfavored the 
Santeria faith at the expense of secular institutions.  Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993).  However, the COVID-19 cases are not comparable to the facts of Lukumi for two key reasons.  First, 
settings such as grocery stores, pharmacies and other stores where people can buy food, medicine and other goods 
facilitate individuals’ ability to physically survive the pandemic.  No such life-or-death conditions existed to support 
the City of Hialeah’s attempts to regulate animal slaughter.  Second, for the reasons described in this paper, the 
types of social interactions restricted at in-person religious services under these COVID-19 orders are dissimilar 
from the types of interactions that occur in places like supermarkets.  Those differences are directly related to the 
likelihood of virus transmission.  In Lukumi, by contrast, the conduct at issue was effectively the same regardless of 
whether it occurred in a religious or secular setting.   
163 Aschwanden, supra note 10; Adam & Cowling, supra note 9. 
164 Roman Catholic Diocese, 2020 WL 6948354, at *2; Nelson & Jones, supra note 140. 
 27 
that the New York order was not narrowly tailored to address the state’s interest in mitigating the 
spread of coronavirus because “there [were] many other less restrictive rules that could be 
adopted” such as setting attendance limits for in-person worship services based on “the size of 
the church or synagogue.”165  In coming to this conclusion, the Court entirely disregarded the 
scientific underpinnings of the New York order.166  Under the Court’s reasoning, which would 
link capacity restrictions to the physical size of a venue, a megachurch, for example, could 
theoretically hold in-person services with hundreds of congregants present even if restricted to 
half its capacity.167  Although the ability to physically distance attendees is one factor in reducing 
the spread of coronavirus, that factor alone is not dispositive.168  The science is clear that 
reducing the number of people who gather together in any one place is a crucial factor in 
reducing the spread of the virus, at least in part because increasing the number of people allowed 
at a gathering increases the likelihood that a COVID-positive individual will be in attendance.169  
In holding that the New York order was not narrowly tailored and thus failed strict scrutiny, the 
Court ignored these realities and instead measured the risk mitigation options available to the 
state against a standard that was not supported by science.  Because the state has no meaningful 
alternative to restricting indoor mass gatherings, such restrictions are narrowly tailored to 
address the state’s interest in mitigating the spread of COVID-19, and therefore the order should 
have survived strict scrutiny.   
The facts of Calvary Chapel, however, lend themselves to a different outcome under 
strict scrutiny.  As indicated above, the Supreme Court did not address a strict scrutiny analysis 
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in that case.  However, assuming, as asserted above, that the Nevada order at issue was not 
facially neutral and generally applicable, a strict scrutiny analysis would be warranted.170  Unlike 
the New York order, which restricted similar types of indoor mass gatherings, Nevada 
selectively applied such restrictions to particular types of institutions but not others – namely, the 
restrictions applied to houses of worship but not to casinos.171  It would therefore be difficult for 
the state to assert that this rule was “narrowly tailored” to address the pandemic because the state 
could reasonably have implemented equal rules for similar gathering types.172  Because Nevada’s 
order did not do so, and instead provided preferential treatment to a kind of secular institution 
(casinos) at the expense of religion, it would be unlikely to survive a strict scrutiny analysis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The global COVID-19 pandemic has altered nearly every aspect of social life since its 
onset.  In-person religious services have not escaped the impact of the virus.  In an effort to 
mitigate the effects of COVID-19 and curb its spread, various states have issued orders 
impacting the ability of houses of worship to host in-person services.  These orders have been 
challenged under the Free Exercise Clause, presenting challenges for courts in determining the 
appropriate criteria to apply.  In the three primary COVID-19-related cases considered to date by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, the Justices have applied inconsistent reasoning in rendering decisions 
about these orders.  Were the Court to consistently apply Chief Justice Roberts’ reasoning in his 
 
170 Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2607 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Even if the Nevada order were to be facially neutral 
and generally applicable, applying the hybrid analysis articulated in Yoder, a strict scrutiny analysis may 
nevertheless be warranted if the court were to determine that, in addition to Free Exercise claims, there are other 
constitutional claims (such as freedom of assembly) at issue.  However, based on the COVID-19 decisions to date, 
this does not appear to be an approach the Supreme Court is adopting.  In Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, the 
Court moved to strict scrutiny only after finding that the New York COVID-19 order was not facially neutral and 
generally applicable.  Roman Catholic Diocese, 2020 WL 6948354, at *2. 
171 Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2606. 
172 Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2606-07 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 
 29 
S. Bay concurrence, it is likely that the Court would find that stay-at-home orders that restrict 
both in-person religious services and in-person gatherings at secular venues of similar 
characteristics pass constitutional muster.  Because the Court has not always adopted this 
approach (which is grounded in scientific evidence), certain stay-at-home orders (such as the one 
in New York) that arguably satisfied the Free Exercise Clause have been struck down, while 
others that appear to plainly discriminate against religious services (such as Nevada) have been 
allowed to continue.  With no clear end to the pandemic in sight, states will need to balance 
public health considerations against the need to comply with the Free Exercise Clause. 
 
 
